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Abstract 
In this article we use global and regional data from the SARS epidemic in conjunction 
with a model of susceptible, exposed, infective, diagnosed, and recovered classes of people 
( "SEIJR") to extract average properties and rate constants for those populations. The 
model is fitted to data from the Ontario (Toronto) in Canada, Hong Kong in China 
and Singapore outbreaks and predictions are made based on various assumptions and 
observations, including the current effect of isolating individuals diagnosed with SARS. 
The epidemic dynamics for Hong Kong and Singapore appear to be different from the 
dynamics in Toronto, Ontario. Toronto shows a very rapid increase in the number of 
cases between March 31st and April 6th, followed by a significant slowing in the number 
of new cases. We explain this as the result of an increase in the diagnostic rate and in 
the effectiveness of patient isolation after March 26th. Our best estimates are consistent 
with SARS eventually being contained in Toronto, although the time of containment is 
sensitive to the parameters in our model. It is shown that despite the empirically modeled 
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heterogeneity in transmission, SARS' average reproductive number is 1.2, a value quite 
similar to that computed for some strains of influenza [2]. Although it would not be 
surprising to see levels of SARS infection higher than ten per cent in some regions of 
the world (if unchecked), lack of data and the observed heterogeneity and sensitivity of 
parameters prevent us from predicting the long-term impact of SARS. The possibility 
that 10 or more percent of the world population at risk could eventually be infected with 
the virus in conjunction with a mortality rate of three-to-seven percent or more, and 
indications of significant improvement in Toronto support the stringent measures that 
have been taken to isolate diagnosed cases. 
1 Introduction 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a new respiratory disease which was first identified 
in China's southern province of Guangdong. SARS is not merely a local endemic disease: it 
poses a serious risk to the medical community, is a threat to international travelers, is having 
a substantial negative economic impact in parts of East Asia and is spreading world-wide. The 
serious danger SARS poses to the medical community is illustrated by the numerous cases 
of transmission to health-care workers. Startlingly, the man who awakened the world to the 
dangers of SARS, Dr. Carlo Urbani, succumbed to the disease. Cases of transmission between 
aircraft passengers are suspected, and relatively short visits to epidemic regions have resulted 
in infection. The most striking feature of SARS, however, has proven to be its ability to rapidly 
spread on a global scale. One man with SARS made 7 flights: from Hong Kong to Munich to 
Barcelona to Frankfurt to London, back to Munich and Frankfurt before finally returning to 
Hong Kong [3]. Another individual, a 26-year-old airport worker, appears to have transmitted 
the disease to 112 people [4]. Clearly, there is an unfortunate interaction between the incubation 
period of the virus, the widely distributed severity and infectiousness of SARS in different people 
and the speed and volume of passenger air travel. The adverse economic impact in parts of East 
Asia far exceeds the disruption of previous outbreaks of avian influenza, earning comparison 
with the 1998 financial market crisis in that part of the world [5, 6, 7]. Although the causative 
agent of SARS has been determined [8, 9], a detailed understanding of the causative virus' 
pathogenticity and routes of transmission and the dynamics of the epidemic is still at a very 
early stage. It is uncertain how the virus is transmitted: by droplet or airborne transmission 
or person-to-person contact. The recent development of laboratory tests promises to improve 
the epidemiological situation somewhat [10]. 
SARS is a public health crisis on a scale rarely seen. The obvious question in such a crisis 
is, "can SARS be contained?" In this study, we report transmission parameters and epidemic 
dynamics from a model based on classes of people who are susceptible, exposed, infectious, 
diagnosed, and recovered ( "SEIJR") that includes the effect of patient isolation. Our model is 
consistent with the possibility of containment in Toronto, Ontario. 
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2 SARS epidemiology and related issues 
SARS was first identified in November 2002 in the Guongdong Province of China [11]. By 
February 26, 2003 officials in Hong Kong reported their first cases of SARS and no later than 
March 14th of this year the virus reached Canada [12]. As of April 17th, Canada is the only 
location outside of Asia which has seen deaths as a result of SARS (13 so far) [13]. U.S. health 
officials are currently investigating 199 cases in 34 states (Apri 17, 2003) [14]. 
An individual exposed to SARS may become infectious after an incubation period of 2 - 7 
days (or longer) [33] with 3- 5 days being most common [15]. Most infected individuals either 
recover, typically after 7 to 10 days, or suffer 4% mortality or higher [16, 21, 35]. SARS appears 
to be most serious in people over age 40, especially those who have other medical problems such 
as heart or liver disease. Its symptoms are similar to pneumonia or other respiratory ailments 
and include a high fever (2:: 38° C), shortness of breath, dry cough, headache, stiff or achy 
muscles, fatigue and diarrhea [17]. These symptoms, however, are not uniform. In the US, for 
example, the disease seems to be a milder one than in Asia [18]. The result has been that SARS 
was, and for the moment remains, a diagnosis of exclusion. 
Presently, there is no treatment for SARS [19] and diagnostic tests are just becoming avail-
able [10]. The mortality rate is reported to be 4% or higher world-wide[21, 35]. Experts 
estimate that between 80 and 90 percent of people with SARS recover without medical inter-
vention, while the condition of the remaining victims requires medical care [17]. As of April 
17, 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported 3, 389 cases (a mixture of probable 
or suspected cases) in 26 countries. 165 victims are reported to have died [14]. 
Although researchers in the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam recently demonstrated 
that a coronavirus (some of which produce common colds) is the causative agent of SARS, 
the mode of transmission still remains unknown [14]. The current hypothesis is that SARS 
is transmitted mainly by close person-to-person contact which may explain the relatively slow 
transmission scale. However, it could also be transmitted through contaminated objects, air or 
by other unknown ways [22]. It is also a mystery how the disease originated, whether in birds, 
pigs or other animals, nor is it known if the origin is rural or urban [23]. 
In this article, a simple model for SARS outbreaks is formulated (see [24]). The model is 
used in conjunction with global and local SARS data to estimate the initial growth rate of 
the SARS epidemic. These rates are used to estimate SARS' basic reproductive number, R0 , 
the classical epidemiological measure associated with the reproductive power of a disease. R0 
estimates the average number of secondary cases of infection generated by a typical infectious 
individual in a population of susceptibles [25] and hence, it is used to estimate the initial growth 
of a SARS outbreak. We estimate (using data from Ontario, Hong Kong and Singapore) that 
R0 is about 1.2. This value is not too different from past estimates of R0 for influenza (see 
[2]) despite the fact that superspreaders of SARS have been identified. In fact, the parameter 
values resulting on this R0 , on our population-scaled model, can lead to extremely high levels of 
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infection). We show, via simple extrapolation, that the estimated rate of growth is consistent 
with the reported date for the first cases of SARS in Hong Kong, however the first cases in 
Toronto may be several weeks earlier than the February 23 date of the first case reported by 
the Canadian Health Ministries [26]. Our best "rough" estimate for Toronto is that the first 
case occurred sometime around January 29th, and not later than February 28th. The data for 
Hong Kong are fitted by fixing the parameters k, r5 and /l based on estimates of the observed 
rates for the corresponding processes. The growth rate (3 is estimated from observed "model-
free" exponential growth in Singapore and Hong Hong. The average diagnostic rate a and the 
measure of heterogeneity between the two susceptible classes p and the effectiveness of patient 
isolation measures (related to l) are then varied to fit the initial data for Hong Kong and 
Singapore. To model the data in Toronto, we must postulate that the parameters describing 
the rate of diagnosis (a) and isolation (l) in the Canadian outbreak changed radically on March 
27. Two hospitals in Toronto were closed about that time: Scarborough Grace Hospital on 
March 25th and York Central Hospital on March 28th [20]. The remainder of this article is 
organized as follows: Section 4 introduces the basic model and gives an approximate formula 
for R0 in the special case where class E only makes a minor contribution to basic reproductive 
rate; Section 5 describes the results of simulations and connections to data; and, Section 6 
collects our final thoughts. 
3 SARS' Transmission Model 
U.S. data is limited and sparsely distributed [27, 28] while the quality of China's data is hard to 
evaluate [29]. On the other hand, there appears to be enough data for Toronto [26], Singapore 
and Hong Kong [30] to make limited preliminary predictions using a model that includes the 
effects of suspected mechanisms for the spread of SARS. Limited data and inconclusive epi-
demiological information place severe restrictions on efforts to model the global spread of the 
SARS etiological agent. 
Thus, we model single outbreaks, ignoring demographic processes other than the impact 
of SARS on survival. The model is applied to data from Toronto, Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Because the outbreak dynamics in Singapore and Hong Kong are different from those in Toronto, 
some of the results may only be indicative of what is happening in those regions of the world (in 
particular our parameters a and l may change). The situation must be re-evaluated frequently 
as SARS continues its travels around the world. 
Here we describe a model that incorporates, in a rather crude way, some of the important 
characteristics suggested in the literature (unequal susceptibility, symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic individuals, mode of transmission, superspreaders, etc.) [22, 31, 32, 27]. The goal is 
to use the results for single outbreaks as a first step in our efforts to gauge the global impact 
of SARS. Hence, we focus on three "closed" populations (Southern Ontario (Toronto), Singa-
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pore and Hong Kong) and postulate differences in the degree of susceptibility to SARS [4, 17]. 
These differences may be due to variations in contact rates, age-dependent susceptibility or 
"unknown" genetic factors. This last assumption is handled (in a rather crude and arbitrary 
way) via the introduction of two distinct susceptible classes: S1 , the most susceptible, and S2 , 
less so. Initially, S1 = pN and S2 = (1 - p)N where p is the proportion of the population 
size N that is initially at higher risk of SARS infection. The parameter p is a measure of 
reduced susceptibility to SARS in class S2 [17, 4]. E ("exposed") denotes the class composed 
of asymptomatic, possibly infectious (at least some of the time) individuals. Typically, it takes 
some time before asymptomatic infected individuals become infectious. The possibility of lim-
ited transmission from class E is included, in a rather crude way, via the parameter q (see 
Table 1). The class I denotes infected, symptomatic, infectious, and undiagnosed individuals. 
!-individuals move into the diagnosed class J at the rate Q. Individuals recover at the rates 
11 (I class) and 12 (J class). The rate 8 denotes SARS' disease-induced mortality. The classes 
R is included to keep track of the cumulative number of diagnosed and recovered, respectively. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that diagnosed individuals are handled with care. Hence, they 
might not be (effectively) as infectious as those who have not been diagnosed (if l is small). 
The parameter l takes into account their reduced impact on the transmission process (smalll 
represents effective measures taken to isolate diagnosed cases and visa versa). Table 1 includes 
parameters' definitions and the initial values used. Our SARS epidemiological model is given 
by the following nonlinear system of differential equations: 
s1 -f3S (I+qE+lJ) 1 N ' 
s2 -f3pS (I+qE+lJ) 2 N ' 
E = f3(S1 + pS2) (I+q~+lJ) - kE, (1) 
I kE-(Q+!1 +8)I, 
J = Qj- (12 + 8)J, 
R /11 + /2J, 
which is refered to as "SEIJR," after the variables used to name the classes. 
The values of p and q are not known and are fixed arbitrarily while l and Q are varied 
and optimized to fit the existing data (least-squares criterion) for Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Toronto. We did not explored the sensitivity of the model to variations in p and q because they 
are not known and cannot be controlled. All other parameters were roughly estimated from 
data [26, 30] and current literature [22, 33, 15, 16]. In particular, the transmission rate f3 is 
calculated from the dominant root of the third order equation obtained from the linearization 
around the disease-free equilibrium [25]. The parameters l and Q were allowed to vary when 
fitting the data for each location (Singapore, Hong Kong and Toronto). Some restrictions apply, 
for example, the value of Q > /1· We also require that 1/12 = 1/J1 - 1/Q, a statement that 
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members of the diagnosed class J recover at the same rate as members of the undiagnosed class 
I. 1/"(1 has been reported to be between 7 and 10 days [21, 16]. From the second generator 
approach [25], we obtain the following expression for the basic reproductive number: 
(2) 
which can be easily given an epidemiological interpretation (see Appendix). The use of pa-
rameters estimated from Hong Kong (Table 1) gives a values of R0 = 1.2 (Hong Kong) and 
R0 = 1.2 (Toronto, assuming exponential growth) and R0 = 1.1 (Singapore). 
4 Simulation Results 
Initial rates of growth for SARS outbreaks in different parts of the world (see Figure 2) are 
computed using the data provided by WHO [30] and the Canadian Ministry of Health [26]. 
These rates are computed exclusively from the number of cases reported between March 31 and 
April 14. The values obtained are 0.0405 (world data), 0.0496 (Hong Kong), 0.054 (Canada), 
0.054 (Toronto) and 0.037 (Singapore). 
For our numerical simulations, we start with an infectious individual (not yet diagnosed, 
I(O) = 1) and crude estimates for the start of SARS outbreaks (t0 ) are obtained from the 
formula t0 = t - (~ log(x(t))), which assumes initial exponential growth (r, the estimated 
"model-free" rate of growth from the time series x(t) of the cumulative number of SARS cases). 
Results for Toronto, Hong Kong, Singapore and aggregated world data are shown in Table 2. 
The estimated "world" start of the outbreak is November 5, a date consistent with the fact 
that the first SARS case was detected in Guangdong, China in November [11]. These dates are 
used as the starting time of the respective outbreaks. 
For the case of the Province of Ontario, Canada the total population N is approximately 
12 million. We assume that the population at major risk of SARS infection lives in Ontario's 
southern part (particularly Toronto), and is approximately 40% of the total population (p = 0.4 
in our model). It is worth pointing out that this value of p is not critical (that is, the most 
sensitive) in the model. The "model-free" approximately exponential growth rates for the 
various regions of the world are roughly similar except for Canada from March 31st (day 61) 
to April 6th {beginning the day of the jump in the number of reported Canadian cases), the 
number of diagnosed cases grew rv exp(0.081t), where t is measured in days. This rate is 
substantially higher than elsewhere in the world. In the subsequent week (beginning April 7th, 
day 68) the number of probable or suspected Canadian cases rapidly rolls over to a smaller 
growth rate not too far from the rest of the world. We conclude, based on the coincidence of 
the Canadian hospital closures, the jump in the reported number of Canadian SARS cases on 
March 31st and the rapid rise in recognized cases in the following week, that Canadian doctors 
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were rapidly diagnosing pre-existing cases of SARS (in either class E or I on March 26th). If 
we make the assumption that the fundamental disease spreading parameters other than a and 
l are roughly constant throughout the world prior to March 26th, we can reach two important 
conclusions. Beginning on March 26th, in Toronto: 
• a changed from a number 1/a ~ 1/11 - 2 ~ 6 days to l/a1 ::; 3 days, and 
• l changed from an uncertain and relatively large value l > 1/2 to l ::; 0.1. 
If we assume that the fundamental growth rate (3 is essentially constant from one region of 
the world to another, it is difficult for our model to produce growth rates r well above the 
world average, except as a transient response to differences in diagnostic rate a (due to delays 
in response or change in policy). Similarly, the SEIJR model requires fairly small values of 
l to achieve a rapid roll-over in the growth rate of recognized cases. The parametric details 
of how a "second" initial condition for Toronto on March 26th is generated do not affect the 
qualitative aspect of this argument: the Canadian data prior to March 31st (the day of the 
large jump) are probably not as meaningful as data after that date, and hence only bound the 
model from below prior to March 26th. The essential aspect of this before-and-after hospital 
closure argument is that there were substantially more undiagnosed people in classes E and 
I than in class J on March 26th. This is a reasonable assumption given that the number of 
cases reported by Canadian officials more than double from March 30th to March 31st. The 
introduction of behavioral changes starting on March 26 (t = 57 days),alters the fate of the 
disease in a dramatic fashion (see Table 3). 
Fitting the model to the Hong Kong and Singapore data is carried out in a similar fashion 
with p = 0.4, (Hong Kong has about 7.5 million inhabitants, Singapore 4.6 million). The 
estimated transmission rate from Hong Kong data is (3 ~ 0. 75 and for Singapore (3 ~ 0.68. Both 
Hong Kong and Singapore's data are fit with the value q = 0.1. Hong Kong and Singapore's 
measure of contact between diagnosed SARS cases and susceptibles are l = 0.38 and 0.40, 
respectively (see Figure 4). Even though there is some heterogeneity in the parameters for 
Hong Kong and Singapore, they provide an important calibration of our model. Their values 
for l and a are roughly consistent with each other, indicating that the difference with Toronto 
is significant within our model, and pointing to the joint importance of rapid diagnosis a ~ 1 
and good isolation of diagnosed patients l ~ 0 in controlling an out break. While there is some 
indication in the data from Hong Kong of a possible slowing of the outbreak, we did not attempt 
to analyze the slowing or assess its significance. 
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5 Conclusions 
A simple model that can capture the effect of average infectiousness in a heterogeneous pop-
ulation and the effect of isolating diagnosed patients has been introduced to explore the role 
of patient isolation and diagnostic rate in controlling a SARS out break. By examining two 
cases with relatively clean exponential growth curves for the number of recognized cases, we 
are able to calibrate a SEIJR model with parameters a = 1/3 (SARS' diagnostic rate) and 
l ~ 0.4 (isolation effectiveness). We then use our SEIJR model to examine the non-exponential 
dynamics of the Toronto outbreak. Two features of the Toronto data, the steep increase in the 
number of recognized cases after March 31st and rapid slowing in the growth of new recognized 
cases, robustly constrained the SEIJR model by requiring that l ~ 0.05 and a > 1/3 days- 1. 
The model is also used to look at the impact of drastic control measures (isolation). The 
fitting of data shows that the initial rates of SARS' growth are quite similar in most regions 
leading to estimates of Ro between 1.1 and 1.2 despite the recent identification of superspreaders. 
Model simulations are fitted to SARS reported data for the province of Ontario, Hong Kong 
and Singapore. Good fits are obtained for reasonable values of a, the rate of identification 
of SARS infections; "reasonable" values of the control parameters l (a measure of isolation); 
possible values of p, a crude measure of reduced susceptibility (due to genetic factors, age or 
reduced contact rates); q a crude measure of the relative degree of infectiousness of asymp-
tomatic individuals; possible values of p a measure of initial levels of population heterogeneity; 
and, reasonable values of N the effective population size. It is worth noticing that for values of 
N larger than 100, 000 the predictions (proportion of cases at the end of the outbreak, etc.) are 
roughly the same. The introduction of behavioral changes that follow the identification of the 
first case (reduce values of l at the time of the identification and moving aggressively to identify 
cases of SARS by increasing 1/a) result in a dramatic reduction in the total number of cases 
and on mortality in Toronto. Given the fact that SARS appears to kill between three and seven 
percent of infected (diagnosed) cases ([35]), it seems quite appropriate to isolate diagnosed 
people. Although we do not examine the effect of quarantine by varying q, it seems intuitive 
that quarantining those who came into close contact with positively diagnosed individuals will 
reduce the total number of cases. 
Model results and simple estimates suggest that local outbreaks may follow similar patterns. 
Furthermore, the use of relative extreme isolation measures in conjunction with rapid diagnosis 
has strong impact on the local dynamics (Toronto's situation). However, if SARS has shown us 
anything it is that "undetected" and "unchecked" local disease dynamics can rapidly become 
a global issue. 
The research on this article used the latest data available (April 18 for Canada and April 
21 for Hong Kong and Singapore). Recent disclosures [34] reaffirm the importance of carrying 
out the analysis excluding data from China. We have redone the analysis including the data 
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collected up to April 25 and, our conclusions, remain the same. Current data seem to support 
higher values for SARS induced mortality rates [35]. However, our model is most sensitive to the 
parameters l (effectiveness of isolation) and (a) diagnostic rate. It is not as sensitive to changes 
in J. In fact, the consideration of a 7% mortality (J ~ 0.01) rather than 4% reduces the number 
of cases by about 12%. In Toronto, we have estimated 612 diagnosed cases with (l = 0.05 and 
a = 1/3 after March 26th). Perfect isolation after March 26th, (l = 0.00) reduces this number 
to 396 diagnosed cases. The assumption of homogenous mixing implies that our model is likely 
to overestimate the size of the outbreak. Hence, the situation in Toronto seems to support 
the view that this outbreak is being contained. Obviously, the case of the crude model (by 
design) cannot handle high levels of variability (an stochastic model would be desirable). This 
possibility is tested (as it is often done in deterministic models) by looking at the sensitivity of 
the model to parameters (a and l being the most critical). Such sensitivity analyses can also 
help "estimate" the variability in R0 . 
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7 Appendix 
Following the second generator approach [25], we obtain the next generation matrix FV- 1 where 
( 
f3q(p + p(1- p)) 
J= 0 
0 
and 
f3(p + p(l- p)) 
0 
0 
0 
a+ 11 + 8 
-a 
{3l(p + ~(!- p)) ) 
F represents the paths to infection (derivatives of the infection terms) and V represents the 
remaining dynamics (derivatives of all other terms). The three columns and rows correspond 
to the compartments E, I and J. 
The basic reproductive number is the dominant eigenvalue of FV-1 (which will be positive, 
real and simple) 
(3) 
f3 is the common scale for the rate of infection. p is the fraction of compartment S1 susceptibles 
in the population and (1 - p) is the fraction of compartment S2 susceptibles. The infection 
rates for the latter are attenuated by p. Infectives stay in compartment E for t time units on 
average, where their infection rate is qf3, they then all progress to compartment I for a+~1 +o 
time units (on average) where their infection rate is f3. A fraction a:+;1 +0 infectives progress 
from compartment I to J where their infection rate is lf3. Infectives spend, on average, 72~0 
time units in compartment J. 
8 Tables 
Table 1. Parameter definitions and values that fit the cumulative number of cases in class J 
("diagnosed") for Hong Kong. These parameters are used to compute the basic reproductive 
number R0 . 
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Parameter Definition Value 
{3 'fransmission rate per day .75 
q relative measure of infectiousness for the asymptomatic class E 0.1 
l relative measure of reduced risk among diagnosed SARS cases 0.38 
p reduction in risk of SARS infection for class S2 0.1 
k rate of progression to the infectious state per day 1 3 
a rate of progression from infective to diagnosed per day 1 3 
'Y1 rate at which individuals in the infectious class recover per day 1 8 
'Y2 rate at which diagnosed individuals recover per day 1 5 
6 SARS-induced mortality per day 0.006 
p Initial proportion of the popualtion at higher risk of SARS infection 0.4 
Table 2. Estimated starting times of the SARS outbreak. 
Country Estimated start of the outbreak 
Canada February 1st 
Hong Kong November 20th 
Singapore December 6th 
World data November 5th 
Table 3. Long-time model results for Ontario, Canada, assuming various changes in behavior 
on March 26th, 2003. 
l a Infected with SARS Diagnosed with SARS 
0.05 1/3 0.0077% 0.0055% 
0.3 1/3 18% 13% 
0.05 1/6 21% 13% 
9 Figures 
14 
Figure 1: A schematic representation of the flow of individuals between the different classes. 
The model considers two distinct susceptible classes: 8 1 , the most susceptible, and 82 . ,Bf+q~+lJ 
is the transmission rate to 8 1 from E, I and J. pis a measure of reduced susceptibility to SARS 
in class 82 • E is the class composed of asymptomatic, possibly infectious individuals. The class 
I denotes infected, symptomatic, infectious, and undiagnosed individuals. /-individuals move 
into the diagnosed class J at the rate a. Individuals recover from class I at the rate 'Yl and 
12 from the J class. The rate 6 is SARS' disease-induced mortality. The classes R and D are 
included to keep track of the cumulative number of diagnosed, recovered and dead individuals, 
respectively. The quantity C is for comparison with epidemiological statistics; it tracks the 
total number of diagnosed individuals. 
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Figure 2: The cumulative number of SARS cases from March 31 to April 14 (lin-log scale) for 
the World (top data), Hong Kong(second row), Ontario, Canada (fourth row), all of Canada 
(fifth row) and Singapore (bottom row). The data were obtained from WHO [30] except for 
the Canadian data which are from the Canadian Ministry of Health [26]. The Ontario data 
includes suspected and probable cases since March 31. This inclusion explains the jump in the 
data for Ontario on March 31st. The rates of growth of the SARS outbreak (computed using 
data from March 31 to April 14) are: 0.041 (world), 0.050 (Hong Kong), 0.037 {Singapore), 
0.054 (Canada) and 0.054 {Ontario). 
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Figure 3: The circles are the cumulative number of suspected or probable SARS cases in Ontario 
beginning on day 61 (March 31st, the day of the jump) and the number of probable cases up 
until day 60. The data prior to day 61 only bound the model from below. The lines are the 
cumulative number of "diagnosed" cases C from the SEIJR model ( C is the running sum of all 
diagnosed cases J). The fit to the data is given by a change in the values of o: and l on March 
26th. Prior to March 26th, o: = 1/6, l = 0.76. Because the model is poorly constrained prior to 
day 61, the real purpose of this part of the model is to generate sufficiently large classes of E 
and I relative to J on March 26th to give the fast increase in C from day 61 to day 67. After 
March 26th, three scenarios are shown. The fit to the data is given by a= 1/3, l = 0.05 (rapid 
diagnosis and effective isolation of diagnosed cases, dashed line). The second curve is given by 
o: = 1/6, l = 0.05 (slow diagnosis and effective isolation, dotted line) and the third curve by 
o: = 1/3, l = 0.3 (rapid diagnosis with improved but imperfect isolation, dash-dot line). An 
index case is assume on February pt. The transmission rate f3 is computed using the estimated 
rate of growth (r = 0.0543) for the Ontario data as described in the text. 
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Figure 4: Cumulative number of SARS cases in Hong Kong and Singapore as a function of time 
(SEIJR model) with l = 0.38 (Hong Kong) and l = 0.40 (Singapore). Singapore has /3 = 0.68, 
all other parameter are from Table 1. The data is fitted starting March 31 (see Figure 2) 
because of the jump in reporting on March 30th. 
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